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Abstract 
This study focused on oversight functions mechanism of Cross River State legislature on public funds. Sample 
size of 900 was adopted for the purpose of the study. Stratified random sampling was used in the study. 
Stratification was done on the basis of geopolitical zone, political party affiliation and educational status of the 
respondents. 900 political party members evenly distributed (300 apiece) among the three leading political 
parties in the last general elections were used as respondents for the purpose of the study. Each respondent has at 
least an SSCE/WASC educational qualification. 300 respondents were interviewed in each of the geopolitical 
zones (i.e. South, Central and North). Two hypotheses were tested. Results showed that the political class 
themselves perceive the Cross River Legislature as not carrying out its oversight function over the state’s Fund 
Appropriation and usage significantly. 
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Introduction 
Democracy is a global phenomenon which almost every nation professes commitment to. The 
democratic crave is lately sweeping across the whole World, from the nation states in the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe to Africa and Asia. This momentum across the globe is arguably as a result of its immense 
advantages, and by implication, because of its capacity to check the negative consequences of bad governance 
(Bello-Imam, 2004). Consequently, democratic pressures all over the World is, among other things, an insistence 
on expression of the will of the people. Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, made the choice to align 
itself with the rest of the world on the democratic crave (Idada and Uhunmwuangho, 2012). 
In order for democracy to be meaningful it must arguably be characterized or underlined by the 
principles of openness, representation, accountability, transparency and the defense, protection and preservation 
of individual and group rights (Vanhanem 1990). According to Lafenwa (2009), democratization project is 
facing a lot of challenges in Africa. Democratic reversal rather than democratic consolidation is imminent in 
most African states. With the coups in Guinea, Mauritanian and Madagascar; flawed electoral processes in 
Nigeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, conflicts in Congo Democratic Republic, Sudan, Cote D’Ivoire as well as 
political repression and social dilemmas in Cameroon; the fluctuating fortunes of democracy in Africa cannot be 
doubted. Besides, there are crises of legitimacy, constitutionalism, security, national question, and dwindling 
international image. These attributes have contributed to the diminishing quality of human life in most of these 
countries. Recently, over 70% of Nigerians are reported to be living below $2 per day and the 2009 Global 
Corruption Barometer released by Transparency International listed Nigeria among the most politically corrupt 
nations in the world. The pertinent question at this point is: Will democracy survive in the wake of electoral 
fraud and violence, unrest and instability, poverty and squalor as well as gradual erosion of democratic standards 
in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular? This question becomes more pressing in the face of failure of most 
safe-guard mechanisms such as legislative oversight function. 
The legislature is the engine of democratic governance, as laws made by it set the agenda for the 
government and regulate the conduct of the people. Besides, its oversight and representational duties are critical 
to sustainable development which is considered as one of the ends of democracy. This study investigates the 
oversight mechanism of the Legislature over the Executive in resolving challenges facing democratization 
project in Cross River State, Nigeria. Most of the studies on consolidation of democratic governance in 
developing countries place less prominence on the significance of the legislature in addressing challenges of 
democracy. This may be due to the perceived increasing dominance of the executive arm and the declining 
significance of this institution in politics. Although legislatures in Nigeria have been variously described as 
‘rump’ assemblies, theatres of illusion, or even mere rubber-stamp chambers, they remain a veritable instrument 
for the democratic process. 
Most state legislatures in Nigeria are generally believed not to be living up to their constitutional 
responsibilities. This defeats the principle of “Checks and Balances” which is a core one in democracy. The 
existence of a viable and functional legislature undoubtedly ensures that the core principles of ‘checks and 
balances’, separation of powers, adequate representation (when compared to their counterparts in the executive, 
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legislators represent more definite and smaller constituencies), proper definition and differentiation of duties of 
three arms of government are enjoyed by that country or society. This in turn would lead, all things being equal, 
to all-round development for that country. Apparent lack of this tradition, for most part, in Nigeria throws up the 
problem for this study. 
For the purpose of this study, benchmarks as stated by the Constitution of Nigeria (FGN, 1999) shall be used. 
According to Section 128, Sub-Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution of Nigeria, the Constitution provides the 
following as part of the duties of the state legislature: 
• Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a House of Assembly shall have power by resolution 
published in its journal or in the Official Gazette of the Government of the State to direct or cause to be 
directed an inquiry or investigation into: 
1. Any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws; and  
2. The conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged, or 
intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for -  
a. Executing or administering laws enacted by that House of Assembly, and  
b. Disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by such House.  
• The powers conferred on a House of Assembly under the provisions of this section are exercisable only 
for the purpose of enabling the House to: 
1. Make laws with respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in 
existing laws; and  
2. Expose corruption, inefficiency of waste in the execution or administration of laws within its 
legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it.  
Objective 
The specific objectives of this study are:  
1. To determine to what extent Cross River State legislature carry out their oversight function over the 
administration of public fund or Consolidated Revenue. 
2. To ascertain factors affecting the performance of oversight functions by Cross River State’s Legislature. 
 
Research Question 
1. To what extent does the Cross River State legislature undertake its constitutional oversight function 
over the administration of the State’s public fund (Appropriated or Consolidated revenue)? 
2. What factors are responsible for the ability or inability of the legislature to carry out a significant 
oversight function over the administration of the State’s public fund? 
 
Hypothesis 
1. Cross River State legislature do not significantly carry out its oversight function over the administration 
of Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
2. Cross River State legislature do not significantly carry out its oversight function over the administration 
of Budgeting Appropriations 
 
Literature Review  
Over the years, the idea of democracy has been a fundamental issue in political thought. Abraham 
Lincoln, the famous American statesman and President is credited amongst the earliest political thinkers who 
defined democracy “as government of the people by the people and for the people” (Keefe and Ogul, 1981: 6) 
To him and others that shared his line of thinking, a democratic government is that which is made up of people 
that are elected by a people for the well-being of the generality of the people. Thus, democracy is basically a 
contract system of sorts invlolving an agreement between the ruler and the ruled to govern according to the rules; 
it represents a system of government that is meant to ensure good life for the people. Lincoln’s line of thinking is 
shared by many scholars (Price 1985; Chazzan, 1992; May, 1976). 
In his treatise, Price (1985:36) felt that it is easy for a government to rule its people by coercion, issuing 
decrees and compelling the people by force to obey them, as is the case of Nigeria under Military regimes. But, 
as the Nigerian experience has shown, this does not, in the long run, lead to stability. A solution to this problem 
is the establishment of democracy, it is generally argued. According to Price (1985), and Chazan (1992), the idea 
of democracy could be traced to ancient Greece where, in the democratic city-states of Athens, all the adult male 
citizens used to meet together in an assembly in which issues of policy were debated, decisions were taken, and 
laws were enacted. No citizen could thus claim that polices are foisted upon the community against his will. This 
practice has been adopted (drastically modified) by modern great nations states like Britain and the United States 
of America, among others. But because, in these states, distances between the various constituents of the states 
make it prohibitive to bring all entitled citizens together in one place to discuss policy issues, an alternative 
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approach was derived. 
This alternative approach was, according to May (1976:8) developed in England roughly between A.D 
1250 and 1650. This was the idea of “representative government” where small local groups of citizens have the 
right to choose representatives of their own interests to sit together in a national assembly or parliament. 
According to May, (1976) by 1959, it had been established that parliament was more powerful than the king 
himself, who was thus bound by the decisions of this representative body. The analysis so far indicates that 
central to the idea of representative governance (or democracy) is the rationale for “popular rule”. Price (1985:38) 
buttressed this contention through his identification of three essential preconditions for the satisfactory working 
of representative government, namely: 
I) The assembly must be as truly representative as it is possible to make it; 
2) Members of the assembly as people’s watchdog must be free to discuss issues with complete frankness 
and to reach decision without hindrance; and 
3) The assembly’s decisions must be binding and enforceable. 
On his part, Lijphart (1977) specifically adopted Abraham Lincoln’s definition of democracy as 
“government by the people”. This definition however, raises a lot of fundamental question. For instance, does 
the idea of “by the people” presuppose every individual in the society? If so, does it imply that every person in 
the state, including the insane and the imprisoned, has the right to participate in decision-making? Scholars such 
as Oyovbaire (1987) and Elaigwu (2000) question the above definition of democracy. According to Elaigwu 
(2000) the term democracy is perhaps the most polemical word in political dictionary, which has been subjected 
to so many interpretations and adoptions in various parts of the world. Oyovbaire (1987) was more damming in 
his rejection of the definition of democracy as meaning “government by the people”. According to him such a 
definition is oblivious of the elite theory according to which there is no government by the people; what we have 
instead is government by the few–the power elite – over the many; but even here, the question arises as to how 
the power elite derive their power? Do they openly compete for power in organized formations? And, do the 
people meaningfully participate in the choice of the people that govern them? 
Answering these questions, Joseph Schumpeter (in Lijphart, 1977) tells us that democracy is a political 
method by which the individual acquires the power to participate in decision by means of competitive struggle 
for the people’s vote. It is this competition for the people’s vote in a free and fair election that Schumpeter (1977) 
felt is the distinguishing characteristic of the democratic method. By competing for votes, aspirants for political 
power, be they individuals or organization (e.g. political parties) subject themselves periodically to the people’s 
control since the people can vote out of office the individual or groups of leaders that is unresponsive to their 
needs and demands and vote in another that promises to do so or is capable of doing better. Oyewole (1987: 21) 
succinctly noted in agreement that: periodic elections ensure the dependence of the representatives on the 
constituency. It forces them to anticipate the time when the exercise of their power will be reviewed; when their 
power may end and they may therefore have to descend to the level from which they were raised. 
Authority, according to Elaigwu, (2000) emanates from the people. Any authority that does not emerge 
from the consent of the people is not democratic. He admitted that how the consent is sought or operationalised 
may vary from one system and/or country to the other. The principles of popular consent, mandate and 
representation entails a concomitant responsibility and accountability to the people. The exercise of the power of 
oversight by the legislature, in practical terms, is an important way of exacting responsibility and accountability 
from those in power by those who they represent. Leaders in a democratic set up must be held responsible for 
their actions as representative of the people who are entrusted with power to achieve particular ends. To achieve 
this, there must be in existence a mechanism of oversight function among others, to check the excesses of the 
government in power. It is this mechanism which constantly ensures that the spirit of accountability is 
maintained and government policies are rational and correct.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
The Institutional theory is used for the purpose of this study. Two defining elements are shared by the 
theoretical approaches to institutionalization in organizations (most explicit in Zucker 1977:728): (a) a rule-like, 
social fact quality of an organized pattern of action (exterior), and (b) an embedding in formal structures, such as 
formal aspects of organizations that are not tied to particular actors or situations (non-personal objective). The 
Concept of Environment as institution was proposed by Thomas & Meyer (1984). Institutional environments 
obtain their defining power from "rationalization" and from accompanying state elaboration. These environments 
are constructed as one consequence of a much wider "state project," related to expansion of state jurisdiction 
(Thomas & Meyer 1984:469). This "statist" view conceives of the collective normative order, including the 
professions and widespread agreements shared by members of organizational fields, as linked to a broad 
conception of the state (Thomas et. al., 1987; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Conformity of organizations to the 
collective normative order increases the flow of societal resources and enhances "long-run survival prospects" 
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(Meyer & Rowan 1977:252). Institutional elements invariably come from outside the organization. When 
organizations respond to external institutional pressure (or possibly only to coercive pressure as in DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983), they protect their technical activities through decoupling elements of structure from other 
activities and from each other, thus reducing their efficiency (Meyer & Rowan 1977:357, Weick 1976, Selznick 
1949). In contrast, in line with predictions from economic theory, firms that operate in the technical sector 
"succeed to the extent that they develop efficient production activities and effective coordination structures" 
(Scott & Meyer 1983:141). But efficiency and success do not necessarily covary in institutional theory: 
Organizational conformity to the institutional environment simultaneously increases positive evaluation, 
resource flows, and therefore survival chances, and reduces efficiency. In this view, the social becomes mythical 
and implicitly dysfunctional in strict task performance terms, while the technical remains real and rational 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977:356-57). Institutionalized organizations serve many important legitimating functions, but 
the core tasks are not performed as well as they would be in a market-oriented organization, and basic 
organizational objectives are also often deflected (Selznick 1957, reviewed in Perrow 1986:159-64). 
In the context of this study, the Cross River State Legislature is the organization while the environment 
is the undue and unconstitutional influence of the Executive arm of government as reported by previous scholars 
(Oyovbaire, 1987; Elaigwu, 2000; Bello-Imam, 2004). According to Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) argument, the 
conformity of the Legislature to the Executive increases the flow of resources from the latter to the former and 
enhances the former’s (i.e. member’s) long run survival prospects in political arena. The direction of the 
legislature’s carrying out of its duties invariably comes from outside (the Executive). This in turn leads to 
inefficiency or dysfunctionalism, as suggested by Meyer and Rowan (1977). 
 
Research Methodology 
Study Area 
Cross River State in the south-south political zone of Nigeria is used for the purpose of this study. The 
study covered the three (3) geopolitical zones of the state, namely: the south, central and north. 
Sample size 
Sample size of 900 is used for the purpose of this study. 300 persons (political party members) were 
interviewed in each geopolitical zone (the 300 were made up of 100 from each of three leading political parties 
(in terms of electoral relevance), namely, People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), 
All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)) in Cross River State. 
Sampling technique 
Stratified random sampling is used for the purpose of this study. Stratification was done based on 
geopolitical zone and educational status. 300 persons (political party members) were interviewed in each 
geopolitical zone (the 300 were made up of 100 from each of three leading political parties, namely, People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)). All 
respondents had at least SSCE/WASC qualification. 
 
Analytical Procedure 
One-sample T-test is used for the purpose of this study. One-sample T-test is used for the purpose of deductive 
inference from the observation of responses from the respondents after analysis. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Results 
Four-point likert scale ranking (4, 3, 2, and 1—meaning Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree and Strongly 
Disagree respectively) was used to test each item on the questionnaire.  
Hypothesis 1: 
H0: Cross River State legislature does not significantly carry out its oversight function over the administration of 
Consolidated Revenue Fund (Mean = 2). 
Ha: Cross River State legislature does significantly carry out an oversight function over the administration of 
Consolidated Revenue Fund (Mean > 2). 
Table 1: Summary Statistics on Consolidated Revenue Fund 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Administration of 
Consolidated Revenue Fund 
900 1.3331 .29804 .00993 
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Table 2: One-Sample Test on Consolidated Revenue Fund 
 Test Value = 2                                        
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
Administration of 
Consolidated 
Revenue Fund 
-167.793 899 .000 -1.66694 -1.6864 -1.6474 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the results on data obtained on the variable Consolidated Revenue Fund. Table 1 is 
summary statistics on Consolidated Revenue Fund, Mean = 1.3331. This shows that respondents tend toward 
Disagree or Strongly Disagree in their perception of Cross River State legislature’s oversight function on the 
administration of Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
Table 2 shows the result on One-sample T-test carried out on Consolidated Revenue Fund.  
Decision Rule: When Test Statistic T is greater than tabulated statistic t, reject H0 and accept Ha, but when Test 
Statistic T is less than tabulated statistic t, accept H0 and reject Ha  
Test Statistic T = X-µ/(s/√n) 
  Where X = observed mean 
  µ = population mean 
  s = standard deviation 
  n = number of observations 
  = 1.331 - 3 / (0.298/30) 
  = -1.669/0.00993 
= -168.07 
Since Test Statistic T (-168.07) is less than tabulated statistic t (-167.79), we do not have sufficient statistical 
evidence to reject H0, we therefore accept H0 and conclude that: Cross River State legislature does not 
significantly carry out an oversight function over the Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: Cross River State legislature does not significantly carry out an oversight function over the administration of 
Budgetary Appropriations (Mean = 2). 
Ha: Cross River State legislature does significantly carry out an oversight function over the administration of 
Budgetary Appropriations (Mean > 2). 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Budgetary Appropriations 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Administration of 
Budgetary 
Appropriations 
900 1.2400 .29589 .00986 
 
Table 4: One-Sample Test on Budgetary Appropriations 
 Test Value = 2                                        
 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
Administration of 
Budgetary 
Appropriations 
-168.304 899 .000 -1.66000 -1.6794 -1.6406 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the results on data obtained on the variable Appropriation Bill. Table 3 is summary 
statistics on Appropriation Bill, Mean = 1.3400. This shows that respondents tend toward Disagree or Strongly 
Disagree in their perception of Cross River State legislature’s oversight function on the Appropriation Bill. 
Table 4 shows the result on One-sample T-test carried out on Appropriation Bill.  
Decision Rule: When Test Statistic T is greater than tabulated statistic t, reject H0 and accept Ha, but when Test 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.15, 2013 
 
6 
Statistic T is less than tabulated statistic t, accept H0 and reject Ha  
Test Statistic T = X-µ/(s/√n) 
  Where X = observed mean 
  µ = population mean 
  s = standard deviation 
  n = number of observations 
  = 1.240 - 3 / (0.296/30) 
  = -1.66/0.0099 
= -176.53 
Since Test Statistic T (-176.53) is less than tabulated statistic t (-168.30), we do not have sufficient statistical 
evidence to reject H0, we therefore accept H0 and conclude that: Cross River State legislature does not 
significantly carry out an oversight function over the Appropriation Bill. 
Table 5: Factors Affecting the Outcome Recorded since the Democratic Dispensation 
Factors Number of Agreeing Respondents  Percentage (%) 
Executive dominance 864 96 
Poor knowledge of legislative 
duties by state legislators  
774 86 
Survival instincts by legislators 712 88 
Election of inept persons as 
legislators 
198 22 
 
From Table 5 above shows the factors affecting the recorded outcome as perceived by stakeholders in 
the political arena in Cross River State. It is shown that 864 (96%) respondents considered ‘Executive 
dominance’ as a factor affecting the recorded outcome, 774 (86%) respondents considered ‘Poor knowledge of 
legislative duties’ as a factor affecting the recorded outcome, 712 (88%) considered ‘Survival instincts by 
legislators’ as a factor affecting the recorded outcome, while 198 (22%) considered ‘Election of inept persons as 
legislators’ as a factor affecting the recorded outcome. 
 
Discussion 
From the results above, conclusion can be drawn from analytical test on the two hypotheses that: Cross 
River State Legislature does not significantly carry out an oversight function over the administration of 
Consolidated Revenue Fund; and, Cross River State Legislature does not significantly carry out an oversight 
function over Budgetary Appropriations. 
The findings of this study which underline legislative institutional inadequacy and weakness, are in line 
with a study by Omenka (2008) titled “Legislative Oversight and Socio-economic Development in Benue State” 
whose findings showed that the Benue State House of Assembly is deficient in Law-making, Representation and 
Oversight functions. Instead of exposing ‘corruption, inefficiency or waste’ by government ministries and 
departments, the Assembly itself was enmeshed in corruption and ineptitude. Most laws passed by the Cross 
River State legislature originated from the Executive. The Assembly thereby failed in its important responsibility 
of enhancing ‘good governance’ and being a catalyst for socio-economic development in the state for reasons, as 
it was argued, which include poor resource base, inadequate support staff, lack of financial autonomy, absence of 
up-to-date equipment and, above all, members that are inexperienced on legislative matters. 
Omenka (2008) noted for instance, that the Fourth Assembly of the Benue State Legislature, which 
operated between May 1999 – May, 2003 could not pass into law a single private or member’s bill. All the 
twenty-eight (28) bills that were successfully passed and assented to, by the Executive Governor as laws 
emanated from the Executive arm of the government. Private members’ bills were either left to expire, or killed 
outrightly. The implication of this situation is grave for the even development of the state. In the same vein, in 
Cross River State, from the publications of the Cross River State House of Assembly itself, there is no evidence 
of any legislative enquiry into reported abuses in the use and administration of public funds. There was no single 
case of indictment for misappropriation of public fund when it is a common knowledge that such abuses abound 
in government. 
In line with the findings of this study, Idada and Uhunmwuangho (2012) in their study titled “Problems 
of Democratic Governance in Nigeria: The Way Forward” stated that for there to be significant improvement in 
the democratic processes, amongst others, strengthening of political institutions especially the legislature is a 
must. This view is strongly supported by Ogbonnaya et al. (2012) in their study titled “The Challenges of 
Democratic Governance in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”. They posited that challenges facing the nation of Nigeria 
such as weak democratic institutions and institutionalized corruption, which have confronted democratic 
governance in nigeria since the Fourth Republic in 1999 threaten the consolidation of democratic formula 
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capable of carrying the Nigerian state out of its endemic cycle of democratic and leadership crises. As Makinde 
(2004) has observed, democracy is only possible if the structures, processes and institutions through which the 
people’s will is expressed accommodate their interests and aspirations. Constitutional democracy, all these 
studies agree, continues to falter not only because of the conduct of leaders but also because of inefficient, 
ineffective and deteriorating public institutions, such as the legislature. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
From the findings of this study, as far as legislative oversight function with regard to use and 
administration of public fund is concerned, Cross River State Legislature (like some others elsewhere reported 
by Makinde (2004), Ogbonnaya et al., (2012), Idada and Uhunmwanho (2012) and Omenka (2012)), has 
performed below expectation given the constitutional role and powers it is supposed to wield. This is a clear case 
of institutional weakness on the part of the legislature in Cross River State. 
It is recommended that everything possible should be done to facilitate the creation of a dynamic, 
constitutionally effective and public responsive legislature that is proactive in its legislative duties and, 
independent, but aware of its Constitutional partnership with the Executive and Judicial arms of government in 
Cross River State, nay, Nigeria.  
Other policy measures include regular auditing of the activities and publication of annual reports of the 
national and state legislatures to promote greater transparency and accountability in the use of public funds and 
discharge of oversight functions of the legislature.  
There should be a sensitization campaign to promote greater public interest in the scrutiny of legislative 
actions. To this end, attention should be paid to human capital development policies, programmes and projects. 
The above recommendations should be assiduously pursued by the government at all levels, Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), human development organizations, donor organizations and nations, 
communities and even individuals, this is because under a democratic dispensation, governance and development 
are best optimized by collective civil society participation.  
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Appendix 
STUDY OF OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS MECHANISM OF THE LEGISLATURE OF CROSS RIVER 
STATE, NIGERIA: FOCUS ON PUBLIC FUNDS 
Dear Sir/Madam 
This questionnaire is issued for the purpose of obtaining response (data) for research on the above topic. The 
researcher hereby solicits your honest response. All responses (including yours) are treated with utmost 
anonymity. The respondent therefore is at no risk(s) in giving honest response to all (any) items on the 
questionnaire. 
Thanks for your cooperation. 
Yours 
Chibueze Ikeji Ph.D 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION A 
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SECTION B 
DATA ON RESEARCH VARIABLES 
Below is a list of items, for each, tick as appropriate. 
S/N Oversight function of 
Consolidated Revenue Fund 
Strongly 
agree (SA) 
Agree (A) Disagree (D) Strongly 
disagree (SD) 
1 Cross River Has One 
Consolidated Revenue Fund (And 
No Other) Which Is Supervised 
By The State House of Assembly 
as stated by the constitution 
    
2 All moneys withdrawn from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the 
State are to meet expenditure that 
is charged upon the Fund by the 
Constitution 
    
3 All moneys withdrawn from any 
public fund of the State, other than 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund of 
the State is authorized by a Law 
    
4 All moneys withdrawn from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the 
State or any other public fund of 
the State is done in the manner 
prescribed by the House of 
Assembly 
    
5 The Governor lays before the 
House of Assembly at any time 
before the commencement of each 
financial year estimates of the 
revenues and expenditure of the 
State for the next following 
financial year 
    
6 All expenditures made by the state 
government are contained in the 
Appropriation Bill 
    
7 Remuneration, salaries and 
benefits are paid to political office 
holders DON’T exceed the 
amount determined by the Fiscal 
Commission 
    
8 The House of Assembly regularly 
conducts inquiry or investigation 
into the administering of public 
funds 
    
 
Possible Factors Affecting Outcome Agree Disagree 
1 Executive dominance   
2 Poor knowledge of legislative 
duties by state legislators  
  
3 Survival instincts by legislators   
4 Election of inept persons as 
legislators 
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